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In this era of multi-national corporations and transnational business
dealings, dissimilar and competing sovereign laws have and will
continue to create . a commensurate increase in litigation to determine
whose national laws must apply and which sovereign‘s public policy
should carry the day. Courts are now faced with choice of law and
comity concerns on a regular basis as business entities fight to ensure
that the laws and protections to which they are accustomed are afforded
them in the unfamiliar environs of a foreign courtroom. This Article
addresses just such a battle, in which United States-based lessors and
creditors fought to maintain the protections given them by the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code in the face of conflicting protections provided to the
lessee/debtor—a Brazilian airline—by the Brazilian Bankruptcy Code.
I. INTRODUCTION
The judicial recuperation sought by the Brazilian airline Viação
Aérea Rio Grandense (―Varig‖) was largely a negative experience for the
lessors and creditors involved. This judicial recuperation was the first
major test case under the New Bankruptcy and Restructuring Law of
Brazil (NBRL). 1 This case adversely affected lessors and creditors, most
of whom were U.S.-based and were accustomed to special protections
afforded them by 11 U.S.C. § 1110, which statute specifically provides
greater protection to aircraft lessors and creditors in bankruptcy
procedures than to other secured creditors.2 In the United States, an
aircraft creditor may use § 1110 to circumvent the automatic stay, or any
other power of the court, that would prevent the creditor from
repossessing the equipment (unless the debtor‘s obligations are
performed in full and all prior defaults are cured within sixty days after
the petition for relief). However, the NBRL provides no such protections
in a Brazilian bankruptcy proceeding. Following the initiation of the
main proceeding in Brazil, Varig Airlines immediately brought an
1. See Thomas Benes Felsberg et al., Brazil: New Bankruptcy Law Ready for Signing,
INTER -AM. TRADE REP., Dec. 2004, at 2 [hereinafter Felsberg, New Bankruptcy Law].
2. See 11 U.S.C. § 1110 (2006). Of particular relevance is § 1110(a)(1):
Except as provided in paragraph (2) and subject to subsection (b), the right of a secured party with a
security interest in equipment described in paragraph (3), or of a lessor or conditional vendor of such
equipment, to take possession of such equipment in compliance with a security agreement, lease, or
conditional sale contract, and to enforce any of its other rights or remedies, under such security
agreement, lease, or conditional sale contract, to sell, lease, or otherwise retain or dispose of such
equipment, is not limited or otherwise affected by any other provision of this title or by any power of
the court.
See also Kenneth Basch, Why the Varig Experience Should Not Recur, GUIDE TO AVIATION
LAWYERS, Jul. 2007, at 38.
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ancillary proceeding in New York under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and
the U.S.-based assets subject to the ancillary proceeding were conserved
and administered in accordance with the NBRL. This frustrated Varig‘s
U.S.-based creditors. The airline creditors‘ discontent also stemmed from
the Brazilian court‘s handling of both pre- and post-petition debt claims
arising out of the security and lease agreements. Beyond the issue of
missed rent payments, issues arose regarding the failure to pay
maintenance reserves, to maintain required liquidity to meet return
conditions, and to maintain critical maintenance and parts logs. 3
On June 17, 2005, Varig filed its ancillary proceeding in the
Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York (U.S. Court)
under the former § 304 of Title 11 (the U.S. Bankruptcy Code) of the
United States Code (the Code). (An ancillary proceeding does not
commence a full bankruptcy case, but instead authorizes the U.S. court to
administer limited proceedings in aid of a principal proceeding abroad; a
foreign representative must seek injunctive or other relief, as the
automatic stay is not triggered.) 4 Although the aircraft lessors and

3. Basch, supra note 2, at 38.
4. Petition Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 304 to Commence a Case Ancillary to a Foreign
Proceeding 1, In re Petition of Vicente Cervo, as Foreign Representative of Varig, S.A., et al., No.
05-14400 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) [hereinafter cited in footnotes as Petition Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §
304] [hereinafter referred to in the text as Varig]. Section 304 of the Code read as follows:
§ 304. Cases ancillary to foreign proceedings.
(a) A case ancillary to a foreign proceeding is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of
a petition under this section by a foreign representative.
(b) Subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section, if a party in interest does not timely
controvert the petition, or after trial, the court may
(1) enjoin the commencement or continuation of-(A) any action against-(i) a debtor with respect to property involved in such foreign proceeding; or
(ii) such property; or
(B) the enforcement of any judgment against the debtor with respect to such property, or any act
or the commencement or continuation of any judicial proceeding to create or enforce a lien against
the property of such estate;
(2) order turnover of the property of such estate, or the proceeds of such property, to such foreign
representative; or
(3) order other appropriate relief.
(c) In determining whether to grant relief under subsection (b) of this section, the court shall be
guided by what will best assure an economical and expeditious administration of such estate,
consistent with-(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in such estate;
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and inconvenience in the
processing of claims in such foreign proceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property of such estate;
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by
this title;
(5) comity; and
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creditors urged the U.S. Court not to defer to the NBRL, the Court was
not persuaded. The lessors and creditors argued that because the NBRL
lacked a provision similar to § 1110, 5 which offered protection to a
specific class of aircraft creditors, including secured parties, lessors, and
conditional vendors (collectively ―Varig financiers‖), the U.S. Court
should not give deference to the Brazilian proceeding.6 The aircraft
leasing and credit industry has come to expect those protections when
financing aircrafts and engines; indeed, Congress retained the provisions
of § 1110, indicating that the industry would simply cease financing
relevant equipment if the protections were not preserved. 7 As a general
matter, however, U.S. bankruptcy courts, in an ancillary proceeding, will
defer to the foreign distribution scheme of the main proceeding unless it
unfairly discriminates against U.S. creditors. Consequently, the New
York court extended comity to the main proceeding in Brazil because it
determined that U.S. policy interests and protections behind § 1110 did
not override considerations that favored deference to the NBRL. 8
This Article will compare the protections under the NBRL and §
1110, examine why the U.S. Court extended comity to the Brazilian
proceeding in the Varig case, and review the reasons for the U.S. Court‘s
denial of the Varig Airlines financiers‘ petitions for relief from the
injunctive stay. This Article will do so, in part, by examining two cases
decided under § 304 and the tests that the courts in those cases used to
determine whether to extend or deny comity. The analysis will address
the somewhat unique status of § 1110 against the other provisions within
the Code: modified universalism and its application to the Varig case at

(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for the individual that such
foreign proceeding concerns.
11 U.S.C. § 304 (2004), repealed by Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005, 11 U.S.C. ch. 15, 119 Stat. 146 (Chapter 15 incorporated most of the principles of § 304 and
still allows for ancillary proceedings to foreign bankruptcy actions.). Section 304(c) outlined six
factors for the court to consider in determining whether to grant relief, one of which is comity. Id. A
court may decline to afford comity to a foreign proceeding so long as that court is of competent
jurisdiction and as long as laws and public policy of the forum are not violated. See, e.g., In re
Culmer, 25 B.R. 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also Interpool, Ltd. v. Certain Freights of M/VS
Venture Star, 878 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1989).
5. See, e.g., Otto Eduardo Fonseca Lobo et al., Varig Airlines: Flying the Friendly Skies of
Brazil’s New Bankruptcy Law with Help from Old § 304, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July/Aug. 2007, at
42-43.
6. Id.
7. See Jason J. Kilborn, Thou Canst Not Fly High with Borrowed Wings: Airline Finance
and Bankruptcy Code Section 1110, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41, 51 (1999).
8. Id. (discussing the protections provided by § 1110 that were originally intended by
Congress to encourage financiers to offer favorable credit terms to airline operators and thus
promote industry growth and consumer travel and ensure airlines‘ ability to secure financing for
replacing obsolete equipment with modern aircraft).
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hand, specifically when looking at the relative merits of deferring to the
Brazilian court versus protecting the Varig financiers. Additionally, this
Article will argue that a bankruptcy filing in Brazil today by another
Brazilian airline would still result in an unfavorable outcome to Varig
financiers—in spite of (or perhaps because of) changes made to laws in
both the United States and Brazil following the Varig decision. This
Article will also speculate as to the way the case might differ under
Chapter 15 of the Code and will look at what the UNIDROIT
Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment
(―Convention‖) and its corresponding Protocol on Matters Specific to
Aircraft Equipment (―Aircraft Protocol‖) indicate about the international
economic community‘s approach to handling aircraft priority in secured
transactions and insolvency proceedings. Finally, this Article will reveal
the way the U.S. Court in the ancillary proceeding had the opportunity to
decline the extension of comity to the main proceedings by concurring
with the Varig financiers‘ argument that the public policy exception
labeled the ―escape clause‖ of § 304 provided § 1110 protections to
aircraft.9 However, by extending comity to the foreign proceeding, the
court set a precedent that will likely weaken the reliance of the Varig
financiers on § 1110 in future deals with Brazilian and other foreign
airlines. The analysis in this Article is not limited solely to Brazilian
carriers, but may be applied elsewhere and thus found useful for any
U.S.-based creditor faced with the challenge of confronting a foreign
bankruptcy proceeding in a state whose bankruptcy laws do not have
provisions analogous to § 1110.
II. HISTORY OF VARIG AIRLINES AND ITS BANKRUPTCY
Before filing for bankruptcy, Varig had a long history as a significant
Brazilian airline. At the time of the bankruptcy filing in 2005, Varig was

9. Though § 304 was repealed under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act (the ―BAPCPA‖) in 2005 (after the filing of the Varig case under § 304) and replaced
by Chapter 15 of the Code, financiers today would likely have an even more difficult time
attempting to convince the courts to uphold the § 1110 protections. The pre-repeal cases interpreting
§ 304 still matter inasmuch as the tests applied by courts pre-BAPCPA inform the current Chapter
15 comity analysis. Chapter 15 also implemented the Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency
drafted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade and Law.
The modified universalist approach of the Model Law and its enactment in Chapter 15 expands upon
the principles of comity enumerated in § 304 to make the U.S. Bankruptcy Code even more broad in
its acceptance of foreign courts of law and their decisions in insolvency proceedings. However, the
expansiveness and spirit of international cooperation of the new Chapter 15 on its face is tempered
by several specific provisions that allow territorialism to sneak back into the frame and possibly
allow financiers to succeed in their arguments.
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the largest air carrier in Brazil and Latin America. 10 Having operated
continuously since 1927, its eighty-year history secures Varig a place
among the world‘s oldest airlines. 11 By the end of Varig‘s bankruptcy
proceedings in Brazil in 2006, the Ruben Berta Foundation (―RBF‖), a
non-profit organization founded in 1945, had become the majority owner
of Varig.12 Though Varig has been managed and operated as a private
business enterprise since its inception, the Brazilian State of Rio Grande
du Sol holds a minority interest of less than one percent.13
Varig‘s principal business was and is passenger travel along
domestic routes within Brazil and international routes between Brazil
and the Americas, Europe, and Asia.14 As of May 31, 2005, the airline
had a fleet of 87 aircraft, carried approximately 13 million passengers per
year, and employed approximately 11,456 full-time employees.15 Varig
Airlines has no significant fixed assets, 16 and each of its aircraft is
operated under lease—eighty-three under operating leases and four under
finance leases.17
Varig has long been a marquee brand in Brazil. 18 For years the
Brazilian government protected Varig by limiting competition and
regulating ticket prices.19 In return, Varig compensated government
officials with courtesy tickets and flew unprofitable routes to destinations
the government hoped to tie into the national Brazilian economy. 20
Regulation of all air carriers in Brazil requires government approval of
the acquisition of additional aircraft, opening of new routes, and
changing flight frequency; the government also monitors fares that air
carriers are permitted to charge on each domestic route. 21
Varig eventually penetrated the international market. Flights to the
United States began in 1955, with Varig providing approximately
10. Petition Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 304, supra note 4, at 2.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. An archived image of Varig‘s international routes map can be found at
http://www.airlineroutemaps.com/Latin_America/img/Varig.jpg (last visited Oct. 30, 2009)
(showing Varig‘s international flight routes before bankruptcy).
15. Background and Description of Varig, Varig Bankr. News, June 18, 2005, at § 00001,
http://bankrupt.com/varig.txt (last visited Nov. 13, 2007).
16. Petition Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 304, supra note 4, at 6.
17. Id. at 4. See the discussion, infra, Part IV.C and notes 74–77 for commentary on why the
distinction was at the time significant.
18. Geraldo Samor, Brazil's Not-So-Favored Airline: Once a Government Darling, Varig
Faces Vagaries of Competition, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2005, at A18.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Petition Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 304, supra note 4, at 6.
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eighteen flights each week into Miami, New York, and Los Angeles. 22 In
2004, tickets sold in the U.S. accounted for roughly 5.2% (approximately
US $163.9 million) of Varig‘s flight revenues. 23 Varig estimated that 133
employees were employed in the United States, with 51 of those working
in New York at John F. Kennedy International Airport or at one of two
Manhattan locations.24
In the mid-1990s, Brazil began to loosen its regulations of the airline
industry by allowing low-price competitors into the market. Transportes
Aéreos Marília Linhas Aéreas (―TAM‖) and Gol Linhas Aéreas
Inteligentes increased their offerings to business travelers within and
coming to Latin America, and slowly Varig‘s market share began to
evaporate. 25 Other low-cost carriers, such as Web Jet Linhas Aéreas,
entered the market as well.26 Finally, while the Brazilian government
maintained a high degree of control over Varig, Varig was still a private
company; many of its foreign competitors were wholly or majority
owned by their respective governments and thus had better access to
greater resources and subsidies than Varig. 27
Prior to filing for bankruptcy, Varig made several unsuccessful
attempts to stabilize its finances. In 1994, and again in 1999, Varig
restructured its debt by deferring payments to its creditors.28 This
alleviated immediate pressure, but caused Varig‘s debt burden and future
cash flow requirement to grow. 29 In 2001, after Varig laid off
approximately ten percent of its workers and reduced its fleet, the
Brazilian government considered nationalizing the carrier temporarily.30
In February 2003, International Lease Finance Corporation, a U.S.-based
corporation, seized one of its leased Boeing 777 aircraft from Varig at
the Paris Charles De Gaulle airport due to missed lease payments. 31 Then
in March, GE Capital Aviation Services, another U.S. corporation,
impounded a Varig Boeing 767 bound for Rio de Janeiro while on the
runway at Miami International Airport for non-payment of past due
22. Id. at 5.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Samor, supra note 18.
26. See Webjet Linhas Aéreas, http://www.webjet.com.br/empresa/novosite/index.asp (last
visited Nov. 1, 2007).
27. Petition Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 304, supra note 4, at 7.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Megan Christoph, Comment, Airline Reorganization Under the New Bankruptcy and
Restructuring Law of Brazil, 13 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 451, 457 (2007).
31. Creditors Release Varig’s Boeing 777 Aircraft, ALLBUSINESS.COM , Feb. 3, 2003,
http://www.allbusiness.com/operations/ shipping-air-freight/448097-1.html.
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leasing fees.32
There were two important factors contributing to Varig‘s financial
difficulties. First, the high degree of operating leverage inherent in the
airline industry and the high costs of fuel (and the subsequent inability to
pass rising fuel costs onto customer fares due to Brazilian fare
regulation) caused minor shifts in passenger revenues based on
seasonality or competition to have a disproportionately large effect on
Varig‘s profits.33 Second, because Varig dedicated a large percentage of
its cash flow to service its accumulated debt, and because of the
devaluation of the Brazilian Real against the U.S. Dollar over the years
prior to filing, Varig was intensely sensitive to any decline in revenue. 34
On June 17, 2005—a mere eight days after the NBRL became
effective35—Varig filed for bankruptcy under the NBRL‘s
reorganization procedures.36 At the time of its filing, Varig had a
negative net worth of approximately US $2.5 billion, with debts
amounting to approximately US $4.0 billion. 37 Varig‘s largest single
creditor was the Brazilian state itself, which had claims of over US $3.3
billion for back taxes and Brazilian social security payments. 38
III. HISTORY OF THE BRAZILIAN BANKRUPTCY CODE
Prior to the enactment of the NBRL in June 2005, the landscape of
insolvency in Brazil was a scary place for debtors and creditors alike.
Corporations considering filing bankruptcy faced potentially ―harsh
consequences‖ as a result of ―ineffective and fragmented bankruptcy law
that had been in place since 1945.‖ 39 Under the old law, only merchants
32. Varig 767-200 Impounded in Miami by Gecas, AVIATION D AILY, Mar. 10, 2003, at 5
(pointing out also that Varig attorneys had been in negotiations with Gecas to return several on-lease
aircraft out of the thirty that it had at one time).
33. Petition Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 304, supra note 4, at 8.
34. Id. at 7–8.
35. Felsberg, New Bankruptcy Law, supra note 1, at 2.
36. Petition Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 304, supra note 4, at 9.
37. Id. at 7.
38. Samor, supra note 18, at 2.
39. See Christoph, supra note 30, at 452; see also Christopher Andrew Jarvinen, A Primer on
Judicial Reorganizations and Out-of-Court Reorganizations Under Brazil’s New Bankruptcy and
Restructuring Law, 2005 ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. LAW. PART II § 3, at 10 n.4 [hereinafter Jarvinen,
Primer on Reorganizations] (―Prior to the effective date of the NBRL, the system of corporate
reorganization in Brazil was governed by Decree-Law No. 7661 of June 21, 1945 (the ―Prior
Bankruptcy Law ‖) . . . . [T]he Prior Bankruptcy Law was the target of heavy criticism in Brazil
because it effectively prevented companies from reorganizing, failed to provide a meaningful role
for creditors in the reorganization process and provided minimal protections for secured creditors.‖).
This Article provides an excellent and exhaustive overview in English of most of the changes made
to the Brazilian Bankruptcy Code with enactment of the NBRL. For purposes of this Article, I will
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were eligible for bankruptcy protection.40
Two of the most common types of bankruptcy available to debtors
were bankruptcy liquidation (falencia) and debt rehabilitation
(concordata).41 The majority of all bankruptcy proceedings initiated in
Brazil prior to enactment of the NBRL were falencia.42 While the
concordata was a proceeding similar in some regards to a reorganization
proceeding, it was conducted under strict scrutiny from the Brazilian
courts.43 A court-appointed receiver (comissário) provided oversight,
and a debtor was severely limited with the reorganization strategies that
it could pursue.44 Unlike a Chapter 11 reorganization in the United States
or a Judicial Reorganization under the NBRL, a statutorily-prescribed
percentage of unsecured claims were discharged with a concordata,
while secured claimholders were not affected by any stay and were free
to attempt to collect their claims.45 Ultimately, the concordata was not a
flexible tool for reorganizing a going concern; it failed in large part for
rehabilitating businesses because of the limited discharge of unsecured
debts and the inability of the debtor and creditors to negotiate directly. 46
Furthermore, a significant impediment to secured creditors in Brazil
was the priority scheme for claims. Unlike the varied protective
measures built into the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the prior bankruptcy law
of Brazil placed secured claims lower in priority than two classes of
claims that are conceivably almost unlimited: labor claims in first
priority and tax claims in second priority; and ―because those [two]
claims are frequently enormous in Brazil, there are generally few assets
remaining in a debtor‘s estate to satisfy secured claims.‖ 47 Even
compared to other Latin American countries, Brazilian creditors have
very minimal protection, making credit ―scarce and expensive.‖48 Due to
the high risk of failing to recover in bankruptcy proceedings from a
highlight only those passages that apply most directly to the crux of my argument. For good synopsis
of the entire NBRL, see generally id. and Christopher Andrew Jarvinen et al., Bankruptcy Reform
Coming to Brazil, AM. B ANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2004–Jan. 2005, at 32 [hereinafter Jarvinen et al.,
Bankruptcy Reform].
40. See Christoph, supra note 30, at 452.
41. Jarvinen et al., Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 39, at 32.
42. Id.
43. See Christoph, supra note 30, at 452.
44. See Jarvinen, Primer on Reorganizations, supra note 39, at 11 n.9.
45. See Jarvinen et al., Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 39, at 68.
46. See Jarvinen, Primer on Reorganizations, supra note 3, at 11 n.9.
47. Jarvinen et al., Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 39, at 32.
48. Aloisio Araujo & Bruno Funchal, Past and Future of the Bankruptcy Law in Brazil and
Latin America, 50 ESCOLA DE PÓS GRADUAÇÃO EM ECONOMIA DA FUNDAÇÃO GETULIO VARGAS
[GRADUATE SCH. OF ECON., GETULIO VARGAS FOUND., ECON. WORKING PAPERS], Paper No. 599,
at 48 (2005) (Braz.), available at http://epge.fgv.br/portal/arquivo/1922.pdf.
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Brazilian corporation (and because of the losses that some lenders have
suffered in the past due to loan defaults), Brazilian lenders still protect
themselves with some of the highest lending rates in the world. 49
IV. ENACTMENT OF THE NEW BANKRUPTCY AND RESTRUCTURING
LAW OF BRAZIL
On February 9, 2005, Brazil enacted its new bankruptcy law, the
New Bankruptcy and Restructuring Law (NBRL). This new law gives
insolvent companies a better chance at reorganization and made drastic
reforms to Brazil‘s existing bankruptcy laws, such as those determining
claim priority. The NBRL was the first significant remodeling of
Brazilian insolvency law in over sixty years.50
A. Judicial Reorganization and Limited Automatic Stay Under the
NBRL
Chief among the new provisions of the NBRL is the creation of a
new proceeding: the Judicial Reorganization (Recuperaçáo Judicial).51
Recuperaçáo Judicial is similar to a Chapter 11 reorganization
proceeding under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code: its goal is to preserve the
operation and assets of a bankrupt corporation as a going concern and to
impute a greater social value (in terms of employing workers,
participating in the economy, paying taxes, etc.) than would be true in a
liquidation proceeding.52 In Brazil, reorganization is a recent
development that reforms the financial and organizational structure of
debtors to allow the rehabilitation and continuation of their business,
whereas the older method merely liquidated and eliminated insolvent
companies.
The NBRL‘s Recuperaçáo Judicial provision has several notable
aspects that facilitate the reorganization procedure. One aspect of the
reorganization provision is the institution of a limited automatic stay. 53
49. See Jarvinen et al., Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 41, at 32. See generally Araujo &
Funchal, supra note 48, at 47. (This Article argues that ―creditors‘ rights are only weakly protected
and financial markets are characterized by a relatively low credit volume and high interest rate.‖ The
ratio of private credit to Gross Domestic Product in Brazil is at only 35%, compared to a ratio in
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (―OECD‖) states of 102% during the
period from 1997–2002.).
50. See Jarvinen, Primer on Reorganizations, supra note 39, at 1.
51. See id.
52. See id; see also Araujo & Funchal, supra note 48, at 50 (noting that creditors now have a
much more active role in the proceedings than under the old concordata and that creditors now
directly negotiate with the debtor and vote for the reorganization plan).
53. Lei. No. 11.101, 9 de fevereiro de 2005, D.O.U. de 09.02.2005, Art. 52(III) (Brazil),
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Conceptually, the limited stay provides similar protections to that
afforded under § 362 of the Code. 54 The stay also provides ―breathing
room‖ for the debtor to focus on developing a reorganization plan for its
creditors to negotiate. 55 The stay in the context of the Recuperaçáo
Judicial is limited in duration to a single 180 day period that is not
extendable; yet when the stay expires, creditors may immediately resume
collection efforts against the debtor. 56 Another key aspect of the
reorganization proceeding is that the debtor has sixty days from the filing
of its judicial reorganization petition to submit its reorganization plan. 57
All creditors must approve this plan; if any creditor objects to the
proposal, a formal vote is held, and dissident creditors are bound,
provided that the statutorily stipulated proportion of creditors in each
credit class ratify.58
Thus, the NBRL allows insolvent Brazilian companies to attempt
reorganization under a scheme that is more beneficial to them than the
previous law. Features that make this new law more beneficial include
the limited automatic stay in addition to providing more time to negotiate
with creditors, file the reorganization plan, and obtain approval of the
plan, all of which serve to fulfill the preservation objectives of the
Judicial Reorganization.
B. Prioritization of Claims and Successor Liability Under the NBRL
The NBRL further provides improved benefits over the prior
bankruptcy law with respect to the prioritization of claims as well as
addressing the problems faced by successive purchasers of the debtor‘s
assets.59
translated in Affidavit of Sergio Bermudes, In re Petition of Vicente Cervo, as Foreign
Representative of Varig, S.A., et al., No. 05-14400 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2005) [hereinafter Lei.
No. 11.101]; see also Jarvinen, Primer on Reorganizations, supra note 39, at 3.
54. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006).
55. Lei. No. 11.101, supra note 53, Art. 6; see also Jarvinen, Primer on Reorganizations,
supra note 39, at 3.
56. Lei. No. 11.101, supra note 53, Art. 6, § 4; see also Jarvinen, Primer on Reorganizations,
supra note 39, at 3.
57. Lei. No. 11.101, supra note 53, Art. 53. Given that Brazilian debtors have never before
had this opportunity to reorganize rather than liquidate, an argument could be made that sixty days
may prove to be an insufficient amount of time to meet with creditors and negotiate a plan,
particularly in complex reorganizations such as the Varig proceeding. Certainly this would be true of
most U.S. Chapter 11 reorganizations of any size (even with sufficient precedent existing to guide
the debtor and creditors through the process).
58. Felsberg, New Bankruptcy Law, supra note 1, at 2. See also Jarvinen, Primer on
Reorganizations, supra note 46, at 7. (A thorough discussion of the steps necessary to obtain
approval from creditors and the court is laid out in ―Procedure to Obtain Court Confirmation of a
Reorganization Plan‖ in Jarvinen, Primer on Reorganizations.)
59. Prioritization of claims protects the creditor by getting the most critical work handled
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The NBRL enhances prioritization for secured creditors in three
ways. First, the claims of secured creditors now occupy second position
in priority (after labor claims), supplanting tax claims in the order of
priority. 60 Second, the amount of first priority labor claims is capped.61
Third, the NBRL also protects creditors who choose to continue to deal
with the debtor post petition, primarily by granting an administrative
post-petition priority claim to post-petition lenders over other secured,
pre-petition claims.62 In the event that the reorganization is converted
into a liquidation proceeding and the debtor‘s funds are insufficient to
satisfy all creditor claims, the post-petition claims will enjoy a higher
priority. 63
Additionally, the NBRL provides protection to potential purchasers
of debtor assets where the prior bankruptcy law provided none. The
NBRL protects these successive purchasers from successor liability
where there are claims against the original debtor. 64 In other words,
purchasers can buy a debtor‘s assets and be protected from inheriting any
liability claims made against the debtor. Under the prior bankruptcy law,
no analogue to § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code existed to authorize asset
transfers ―free and clear‖ of liens and interests. 65 Thus, investors were
understandably leery of purchasing assets in bankruptcy proceedings that
were likely encumbered by labor and tax claims. 66 However, certain
categories of claims under the NBRL are no longer subject to successor
liability. Certain types of debtor assets, such as separate production units
or branches of the debtor‘s operations, in judicial reorganization are no
longer burdened by the debtor‘s obligations for tax claims, labor or
work-related injury claims, or social security claims. 67 Thus, under the
first; for example, by allowing claims arising from insurance contracts to have priority over other
types of contracts.
60. Lei. No. 11.101, supra note 53, Art. 83(II).
61. Id., Art. 83(I). See Jarvinen, Primer on Reorganizations, supra note 46, at 6. The cap is
equal to Brazil‘s monthly minimum wage for 150 months. At current exchange rates, the amount of
the cap is approximately US $31,666 per employee (31, 666 = 150 x 380 reals (monthly minimum
wage) / 1.80 reals/dollar (current exchange rate as of October 2007)).
62. Lei. No. 11.101, supra note 53, Arts. 67, 83.
63. Jarvinen, Primer on Reorganizations, supra note 46, at 6.
64. Jarvinen et al., Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 39, at 32
65. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2005).
66. See Jarvinen, Primer on Reorganizations, supra note 39, at 6; see also Jarvinen et al.,
Bankruptcy Reform Coming to Brazil, supra note 41, at 32 (―Because the actual amounts of such
claims are not generally known or capable of accurate estimation at the time of a sale, investors
avoid purchasing assets from debtors. Consequently, the existing bankruptcy laws preclude the
development of an efficient market in Brazil for the sale of assets in bankruptcy.‖).
67. Lei. No. 11.101, supra note 53, Art. 60 (―The object of disposal shall be free of any
encumbrances and the bidder shall not be encumbered with the debtor‘s obligations, including those
related to tax.‖); see also Jarvinen, Primer on Reorganizations, supra note 39, at 6.
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NBRL, creditors will have an incentive to provide financing to debtorsin-possession and will feel sufficiently protected in doing so ―since the
[creditors] will have a prior claim against the assets in the debtor‘s
bankruptcy estate in relation to pre-petition debt and a greater likelihood
of recoveries on their debt in the event of a liquidation.‖68
Therefore, the NBRL provides greater benefits and security to
secured creditors than did the prior bankruptcy law of Brazil. The added
or enhanced features of prioritization and protection from successor
liability cause creditors to feel more protected from insolvent debtors
while subsequent purchasers will be more likely to buy debtor assets.
C. Air Carrier Reorganization Under the NBRL
Despite the many benefits of the NBRL, it also creates some
turbulence for creditors and air carriers undergoing reorganization. For
example, the NBRL disadvantages creditors because aircraft leases are
subject to Article 49 of the NBRL, which provides that leased assets
cannot be repossessed if essential to the economic activity of a company
in recovery. 69
Additionally, the NBRL creates disadvantages for aircraft carriers by
prohibiting some from reorganizing and requiring specific procedures for
others. Article 198 of the NBRL prevents companies not allowed to file
bankruptcy under the concordata of the old law from choosing
reorganization.70 However, fortunately for some aircraft carriers, under
Article 199 of the NBRL, corporations identified in Article 187 of the
Brazilian Aeronautical Code of December 19, 1986, are not subject to
the restrictions found in Article 198 and thus may file a Recuperaçáo
Judicial petition.71 Furthermore, although the identified airlines may file,

68. New Brazil Bankruptcy Law Likely to Improve Recovery Prospects for Creditors, But
Challenges Remain, STANDARD & POOR‘S RATINGS D IRECT, Jul. 5, 2005, at 2 [hereinafter
Challenges Remain], available at http://www.securitization.net/pdf/sp/ BrazilianLaw_5Jul05.pdf.
69. Lei. No. 11.101, supra note 53, Art. 49, § 3 (―In the event of the creditor who is a
fiduciary owner of chattels and real estate properties, or mercantile lessor, owner or prominent seller
of property whose respective contracts contain irrevocable or irretrievability clauses, including estate
institutions or owner in a sale contract with domain reserve, its credit shall not be submitted to the
effects of judicial recovery, prevailing the rights to property over the things or contractual
conditions, observing the respective legislation, not allowing, however, during the suspension period
referred to in §4 of Section 6 of this Law, the sale or removal of the establishment of the debtor of
goods essential for its corporate activity.‖ (emphasis added)).
70. Lei. No. 11.101, supra note 53, Art. 198 (―The debtors prohibited to request
reorganization in bankruptcy under the terms of the specific legislation in effect on the day of
publication of this Law are prohibited to request a judicial or extrajudicial recovery under the terms
of this Law.‖); see also Lobo et al., supra note 5, at 42.
71. Lei. No. 7.565, 19 de decembero de 1986, Art. 187, D.O.U. de 20.12.1986. (Brazil),
(―Those companies who have as their constituent acts the purpose of pursuing air services of any
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the NBRL requires an analysis of the debtor‘s obligations to determine
which ones are subject to reorganization proceedings. 72 It also requires
an analysis of which equipment must be preserved by the debtor as
necessary to maintain the going concern.73
Another disadvantage of the NBRL formerly existed in a loophole
regarding aviation finance contracts. Article 199, which addresses
finance provisions including finance contracts applied only to finance
leases (as opposed to finance and operating leases).74 Article 199 of the
NBRL identifies finance leases of aircraft as being outside of the judicial
recovery proceedings, so that the nondebtor party to the lease could
pursue collection on its collateral notwithstanding the stay provisions of
the NBRL.75 Furthermore, these provisions completely prohibited
Brazilian airlines from rescheduling any obligations arising from aircraft
and equipment leases, essentially removing any stay period at all for
finance leases.76 The Brazilian Congress closed this loophole in
November 2005 by applying Article 199 to both finance and operating
leases.77
Despite the closure of this loophole, there is still tension between
Articles 199 and 49 of the NBRL. Article 199 indicates that there is no
stay at all for aircraft and aircraft engine leases, while Article 49
indicates that equipment necessary to maintain a going concern is not to
be repossessed.78 Thus, airlines may file for judicial reorganization
nature or aeronautical infrastructure cannot petition for concordata.‖). Prior to the NBRL‘s
enactment, Brazil seemed disinclined to allow recovery proceedings for a commercial air carrier
under the rationale that the safety of the general public was at stake; that is, aircraft maintenance and
safety was too great of a public concern to allow to be affected by the financial instability of a
company in reorganization. See Lobo et al., supra note 5, at 42. Presumably, it was preferable for an
airline to be liquidated and sold off rather than allowed to continue on with possibly suspect safety
and maintenance oversight. See also, Challenges Remain, supra note 68, at 6 (―Under the old
bankruptcy regime, airline insolvencies were governed by the federal Aeronautical Code and were
supervised by a trustee appointed by a federal regulator. The airlines sought to have their
insolvencies governed by the New Bankruptcy Code….‖).
72. Lei. No. 11.101, supra note 53, Art. 51(III).
73. Id. Art. 66.
74. Id. Art. 199 (―In the judicial recovery and the bankruptcy of corporations mentioned in the
heading of this section, the exercise of the rights resulting from the finance leasing contracts of
aircrafts or their parts will not be suspended in any hypothesis.‖).
75. See id. Immediately after Varig‘s filing, Brazil amended this section to provide that lease
agreements (including aircraft lease agreements) are not subject to the judicial recovery, according to
the first part of § 3 of Art. 49 of the NBRL. However, air carriers‘ leases would presumably still be
protected under the second portion of § 3, prohibiting the repossession of goods ―essential for . . .
corporate activity.‖ Id., Art. 49, § 3; see Lobo et al., supra note 5, at 72.
76. Lei. No. 11.101, supra note 53, Art. 199.
77. Basch, supra note 2, at 39.
78. See id. (―Article 199 completely prohibits Brazilian airlines from rescheduling any
obligations arising from aircraft and aircraft engine leases. In other words, the stay provided by
Article 199 is zero days. A Brazilian airline in judicial reorganization is allowed to reschedule its
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under the NBRL (an improvement from the prior bankruptcy law, which
prevented them from proceeding under a concordata), but both finance
and operating leases are outside the scope of the stay unless Article 49 is
determined to apply and the leases are necessary for the corporation to
continue as a going concern.79 It is difficult to imagine that this would
not be the case for an airline. Thus, for cases in the U.S. courts, no relief
akin to § 1110 is apparent for aircraft creditors if comity is granted to
Brazilian or similar foreign law.
Therefore, even though the enactment of the NBRL undoubtedly
expanded the flexibility of debtors and creditors seeking to pursue
reorganization and created more options for the judiciary to facilitate the
maximization of value of insolvent companies, 80 the relative newness of
the statute (and its literal newness at the time of the Varig filing), means
there is much to be seen as to its shortcomings. One noted deficiency of
the NBRL, which is discussed further below, is its lack of reference to
cross-border insolvency proceedings—a deficiency especially germane
to this discussion and a growing concern in light of the ongoing
globalization of commerce. 81
V. AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT AND VESSELS UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 1110
In the United States, Congress has long afforded special protection to
financiers of certain equipment such as aircraft, aircraft engines,
propellers, appliances, and spare parts.82 Congressional development of
non-lease debt only. The original language of Article 199, which remains applicable in the Varig
case, contained language that the judiciary intended to limit the scope of the Article to finance leases
only. Future judicial recuperation would be processed under the new language, however, which
closes that loophole. Now all aircraft and aircraft engine leases, regardless of whether they are
finance or operating leases, are protected by Article 199 and should be excluded from judicial
recuperation restructuring.‖). But.‖);but cf. Lobo et al., supra note 5, at 72 (―Nevertheless, as with
any other type of lease, the aircraft lease agreements are still subject to the rule of the first part of § 3
of Art. 49 of the NBRL, providing that any assets that are leased cannot be repossessed from the
debtor if it is essential to the economic activity of the company in judicial recovery.‖).
79. See Lobo et al., supra note 5, at 72.
80. See Araujo & Funchal, supra note 48, for an in-depth discussion of the anticipated
favorable effects of the NBRL on the Brazilian credit market and overall economic efficiency.
81. Jarvinen, Primer on Reorganizations, supra note 46, at 9. See also Thomas Benes
Felsberg et al., Brazil Overhauls Restructuring Regime, 25 INT‘L FIN. L. REV., Jan. 2006, at 40, 44
(2006) (―In 1997 UNCITRAL promulgated a Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency and several
countries, including most recently the U.S. in 2005 with the new Chapter 15, have incorporated the
Model Law in their domestic insolvency laws. But the new Brazilian law does not do so, and this
failure to incorporate the Model Law will maintain the uncertainty and unpredictability that existed
under the old law with respect to multi-jurisdictional insolvencies that include a Brazilian
component, including the process by which Brazilian courts will determine whether to grant
recognition to, or otherwise cooperate with, foreign insolvency proceedings.‖).
82. See, e.g., In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 123 B.R. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that a
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§1110 continued to provide greater protection to aircraft financiers. As
far back as 1957, Congress was concerned with the fact that airlines were
facing ―serious financing problems resulting from the need to replace
obsolete equipment with modern aircraft.‖83 Due in part to the great
capital expense of operating a large fleet of high-maintenance aircraft
and to the extremely high price of purchasing even one modern
airliner,84 most air carriers—even large ones—are incapable of owning
their fleets outright. 85 As a result, air carriers are forced to enter into
complex financial arrangements with both financial institutions and
aircraft manufacturers.86 In these agreements airlines are, perhaps,
predisposed to acquiesce to the demands of Financiers for more
substantial protections for their investments when considering the
statutory protections.87 Today, aircraft financiers continue to argue that
they are unwilling, or at least unlikely, to provide financing for new or
unproven airlines absent the protections offered their investments under
§ 1110 (or at least that the terms they would offer would border on the
usurious).88
Prior to the enactment of § 1110 (the modern version of the law), the
old § 116(5) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Act (Bankruptcy Act) made
reorganization proceedings completely inoperative insofar as they
affected title and the right of aircraft creditors to repossess. 89 Since §
116(5) required debtors to obtain aircraft financiers‘ consent to retain

creditor with a purchase money security interest could take possession of property such as aircraft
pursuant to § 1110 despite the automatic bankruptcy stay). The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49
U.S.C.A. § 40102, defines the types of equipment that are subject to protection.
83. H.R. REP. N O. 85-944 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. (71 Stat. 716) 1926, 1926.
See also Ripple, infra note 85, at 290 (―Most commentators agree that Congress hoped to strengthen
the borrowing power of airlines engaged in fleet modernization by offering equipment financiers
more security on their investment by limiting the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court to modify
their rights to take possession of collateral after a default.‖).
84. A Boeing 767-200 of the type repossessed by Gecas from Varig in 2003, for example,
currently costs between US $124.5 million and US $135.5 million. See Boeing Commercial Airplane
Prices, http://www.boeing.com/commercial/prices (last visited Oct. 14, 2007).
85. See Gregory P. Ripple, Note, Special Protection in the Air[line Industry]: The Historical
Development of Section 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 281, at 281–82, n.4
(―The difficulty these costs impose on start-up airlines is evidenced in the circumstances surrounding
the beginnings of JetBlue Airways. In 1999 the airline launched with $ 130 million in capital
investment, the largest capital buildup in the history of the American airline industry. This amount
would have been sufficient to buy outright only one of the airline's twenty-three Airbus A320s.‖).
86. Id. at 282.
87. Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 47, 48 (―It has, of course, long been assumed that certain narrow provisions of the 1978 Act
reflect the influence of interest groups—for example, the section that gives special protection to
security and lease interests in aircraft.‖).
88. See, e.g., Ripple, supra note 85, at 282.
89. See H.R. REP. NO. 85-944 (1957), supra note 83, at 1927.
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equipment in which the debtor was in default during insolvency
proceedings, § 116(5) essentially gave financiers ―the absolute veto
power over a reorganization.‖90 Additionally, the Bankruptcy Act did not
give a debtor any grace period in which to determine if it would cure
defaults and continue under a pre-petition agreement or if it would
surrender its equipment to the creditor. 91
When Congress enacted § 1110 in 1977, it narrowed the class of
creditors and, rather than perpetuating the aircraft creditors‘ veto power,
crafted § 1110 such that a debtor may remain in possession of aircraft
and aircraft equipment so long as it cures any defaults and reaffirms its
obligations under any pre-petition security agreements or financing
arrangements.92 Section 1110 sets out three prerequisites limiting when a
creditor may receive the protection of its provisions: the protection only
applies to a specific type of equipment, a specific type of transaction, and
a licensed debtor. As such, the § 1110 protection is available to only a
particularly narrow class of creditors. 93 Additionally, this narrow class of
creditors must make a written demand for possession before the trustee
surrenders the collateral.94 Lastly, § 1110 states that the rights of a
financier are not ―limited or otherwise affected by any other provision of
this title or by any power of the court.‖95 The ―title‖ referred to is Title
11 of the United States Code (the Bankruptcy Code); ―power of the
court‖ is defined in § 105 of the Code as the court‘s ability to ―issue any
order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out
the provisions of this title.‖96 This new language allowed debtors to no
90. See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 116–17 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat.
2549) 5787, 5903.
91. 4 WILLIAM L. N ORTON, JR., N ORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 81:1 (William
L. Norton III ed., 2d ed. 2007).
92. See Margaret Sheneman & Cecily A. Dumas, Equipment Leasing and the Bankruptcy
Code, in 1 EQUIPMENT LEASING – LEVERAGED LEASING § 7-1, 7-98 (Ian Shrank & Arnold G.
Gough eds., 4th ed. 2002). It is important to note, however, that § 1110 ―merely provide[s] an
exception to the automatic stay and collateral use provisions of sections 362 and 363; [it] does not
insulate the transportation equipment financier from the other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.‖
Id. at 7-107.
93. 11 U.S.C. § 1110(a) (2004).
94. 11 U.S.C. § 1110(c)(1).
95. 11 U.S.C. § 1110(a)(1) (emphasis added).
96. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2009). See also United Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Bank N.A., 406 F.3d
918, 922 (7th Cir. 2005) (―This takes aircraft out of the automatic stay, see 11 U.S.C. § 362, and
entitles secured lenders and financing lessors to repossess their collateral. There are only two
exceptions. Section 1110(b), which we have mentioned, says that the creditor or lessor may agree to
allow the debtor to continue using the equipment. This is how [the debtor] has retained the aircraft so
far. Section 1110(a)(2), the other exception, gives the debtor 60 days after the bankruptcy begins to
come current on its payments and provides that, if the debtor thereafter makes all payments called
for by the contracts, it may retain the airplanes. [The debtor] is not paying the full amount required
by these leases, so § 1110(a)(2) does not assist it.‖).
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longer worry about possible repossession by creditors, effectively ending
the creditors‘ veto power of reorganization.
Although § 1110 eliminated financiers‘ veto power of reorganization
by greatly narrowing their right to repossess, § 1110 still provided a way
for financiers to repossess but only under very strict standards. Section
1110 provides certain financiers with the right to repossess certain
aircraft and equipment under the terms of their pre-petition agreements
with two exceptions: if within sixty days of the commencement of the
relief proceedings, the debtor either: (1) ―agrees to perform all
obligations of the debtor under [the] security agreement‖ and cure all
pre- and post-petition defaults; or (2) agrees, with the secured party or
lessor whose right to possess is protected, to extend the sixty-day period
specified. 97 If the debtor fails to agree to perform or to negotiate an
extension, the automatic stay of § 362 does not apply and the financier
may recover its collateral to the extent governed by the pre-petition
financing arrangement.98
Thus, §1110 is somewhat unusual in the scheme of the Code in that
it takes the ―adequate protection‖ concept of §§ 362 and 363 further than
usual. Whereas the Code ordinarily provides for payments or other forms
of compensation that are minimally sufficient to maintain the value of
the creditor‘s claim relative to its collateral, § 1110 ―basically rewrites
the concept of ‗adequate protection‘ in the context of qualifying aircraft
equipment . . . to provide the secured creditor [or] lessor with precisely
what it bargained for: compliance with the terms of any relevant . . .
agreement . . . , or return of the property.‖ 99 The legislative history for
the enactment of § 1110 expressly clarifies this:
[t]he major differences for transportation equipment security
interests is that the proposed section defines more precisely what
constitutes adequate protection. It is the payments and duties of the
debtor called for under the security agreement. In the case of a lease, the
protection is the same afforded other lessors, but the trustee is required to
make a decision within 60 days of the order of relief. 100

97. 11 U.S.C. § 1110(a)–(b) (2006); see also Sheneman & Dumas, supra note 92, at, 7-106
(―As a practical matter, the value of the financier‘s or lessor‘s right to repossess the equipment
depends on the market for resale or re-lease of the equipment at the time the debtor‘s sixty-day
period has expired. For example, the financier may prefer to have the debtor operate the aircraft
during a Chapter 11 case under a month-to-month rent stipulation, rather than have the aircraft sit
idle at the end of the runway after repossession.‖).
98. 11 U.S.C. § 1110(c)(1).
99. 7-1110 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, Relationship Between § 1110 and Other Provisions of
the Code, ¶ 1110.05 (15th ed. 2007).
100. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 239–40 (1977).
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Moreover, any post-petition default must be cured within thirty
days.101 The transaction from which the default flows must be an
equipment security interest, a conditional sale, or a lease to qualify for
the protections, and the pre-petition security or lease agreement must
give the financier the right to repossess. 102
Therefore, while limited in scope and applicability, § 1110 is a
potent section within the Code.103 This is exemplified by Congressional
treatment of § 1110, as ―Congress obviously knew what it was doing
when it gave special protection to aircraft financiers. In each of the
amendments in 1978, 1994, and 2000, respectively, Congress broadened
the scope and applicability of § 1110.‖ 104 Any lease or security interest
in aircraft falls under the aegis of § 1110—Congressional 1994
amendments specifically clarified the issues created by the debtor
challenges based on the previous § 1110 language in the Pan Am and
Continental insolvency proceedings of the early 1990s where it was
unclear whether creditors‘ actions to recover aircraft and equipment
leased in sale-leaseback transactions were exempted from the automatic
stay of the operation of § 1110. 105 The 1994 amendments also clarified
that the rights of a § 1110 creditor are not intended to be limited by the
effects of a § 1129 ―cramdown‖ in the reorganization process.106 Section
1129 normally requires that all creditors have their interests met by either
accepting the reorganization plan or receiving their fair share; however,
the confirmation requirements of § 1129 do not apply with the 1994
amendments to § 1110.107 Lastly, after the initial sixty-day stay period
under § 1110 expires, any subsequent breach of the lease or loan terms
gives the secured party an immediate and unqualified right to retake
possession and control.108

101. 11 U.S.C. § 1110(a)(2)(B)(ii)(I) (2004).
102. 11 U.S.C. § 1110(a)(1).
103. Kilborn, supra note 7, at 46 (―Given the significant value of transportation equipment to a
carrier's estate—either in operating the carrier's business or in producing proceeds from assignment
of the carrier's rights under an unexpired lease—debtors have a powerful incentive to fulfill these
conditions.‖).
104. Vanguard Airlines, Inc. v. Int'l Aero Components, Inc. (In re Vanguard Airlines, Inc.),
295 B.R. 908, 919 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2003).
105. In re Pan Am Corp., 929 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 932
F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1991).
106. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2006); see also Ripple, supra note 85, at 296.
107. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-394, § 201, 108 Stat. 4106, 4119 (1994).
108. See Ripple, supra note 85, at 296.

61

INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW

VOLUME 6

VI. BACKGROUND OF CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCIES UNDER THE U.S.
CODE
Varig commenced its bankruptcy proceedings in the United States
under former § 304 of the Code, a code that has had a major effect on the
landscape of international insolvencies, albeit a sometimes unpredictable
effect.109 The now repealed § 304 authorized the initiation of a U.S. case
ancillary to an existing foreign proceeding commenced by the filing of a
petition by a foreign representative of the debtor.110 The ancillary
proceeding was meant to prevent a duplicative effort by the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court in cases where main proceedings have already been
filed in another country, and it aimed to be a ―more efficient and less
costly alternative‖ to initiating a full bankruptcy case. 111 Although
ancillary proceedings did not automatically trigger stay protections, nor
did they automatically grant the petitioner powers of avoidance or create
an estate, 112 § 304 was intended to protect a foreign debtor‘s assets in the
United States by preventing ―the piecemeal distribution of assets in the
United States by means of legal proceedings initiated in domestic courts
by local creditors.‖113
Stay requests could be made in the ancillary proceeding, but were
analyzed on a discretionary basis by the bankruptcy judge using the
guidance provided by § 304. The court, at its discretion, had the ability
to enjoin the commencement or continuation of any action or the
enforcement of a judgment against the debtor concerning property
involved in the proceeding, order turnover of such property to the foreign
representative, or order any relief it deems proper. 114
Section 304 outlines six factors for the court to consider when
determining whether to grant a foreign representative‘s petition for relief:
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in
109. Petition Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 304, supra note 4, at 1. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, P.L. 95-598,
Title 1, § 101, 92 Stat. 2560, repealed by Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005, P.L. 109-8, Title VIII, § 802(d)(3), 119 Stat 146. Section 304 was good law at the time
of the filing of the ancillary proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New
York. Chapter 15 (Ancillary and Cross-Border Proceedings) of 11 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq. did not go
into effect until October of 2005 with the enactment of the BAPCPA, so the Varig case was
conducted under the provisions of § 304.
110. 11 U.S.C. § 304(a).
111. Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs. A.B., 773 F. 2d 452, 456 (2d Cir. 1985). See
generally Joseph Samet, Multinational Insolvencies, in EMERGING ISSUES IN WORKOUTS &
BANKRUPTCIES 2005 at 337 (2005) (program to Practicing Law Institute‘s 2005 workshop on
workouts and bankruptcies; provides a background on proceedings initiated under § 304).
112. See Samet, supra note 111, at 337.
113. In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A., 961 F. 2d 341, 348 (2d Cir. 1991).
114. 11 U.S.C. § 304(b) (repealed 2005).
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such estate;
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against
prejudice and inconvenience in the processing of claims in
such foreign proceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of
property of such estate;
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in
accordance with the order prescribed by this title;
(5) comity; and
(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start
for the individual that such foreign proceeding concerns.115
Naturally, conflicts arise between debtors and creditors—as they did
in the Varig ancillary proceeding—when a foreign debtor requests
injunctive relief under § 304 and the creditor protests, arguing that it
should not have to sacrifice remedies available to it under the U.S. Code
simply because a foreign proceeding is underway elsewhere. 116 In these
cases, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court must decide which of the above §
304(c) factors are applicable and the weight to give each of them when
determining whether to defer to the jurisprudence of the foreign
proceedings and grant the relief requested by the foreign
representative.117
Comity is given great deference118 by a U.S. bankruptcy court in
considering whether to defer to the foreign jurisdiction, and comity will
be accorded so long as the foreign court is of competent jurisdiction and
115. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c) (repealed 2005).
116. See Samet, supra note 111, at 345. For examples of courts applying the § 304 factors to
the facts of the cases at hand, see In re Parmalat Secs. Litig., 472 F. Supp. 2d 582 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
and In re Petition of Davis, 191 B.R. 577 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
117. See, e.g., In re Rubin, 160 B.R. 269, 283 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (enjoining all actions by
creditors against the debtor‘s property in the United States and holding that as long as ―as the laws of
the foreign jurisdiction are not repugnant to our own, there is a distinct judicial preference for
deferring to the foreign tribunal litigation respecting the validity or the amount of the claims against
the foreign debtor‖). But cf. In re Hourani, 180 B.R. 58 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying a foreign
representative‘s § 304 petition on grounds that the foreign liquidation proceedings lacked minimum
safeguards for creditors when it did not distinguish between secured and unsecured creditors in
prioritization of claims); Treco v. Bank of New York, 240 F. 3d 148 (2d Cir. 2001) (declining to
extend comity to Bahamian courts, reasoning that comity did not hold greater weight than the other
factors of § 304(c) and that the Bahamian bankruptcy laws did not substantially accord with the
priority given secured claims in the United States).
118. BALLENTINE‘S LAW D ICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969) (―Literally, courtesy or civility, to which
the law adds some refinements in defining the term for the purposes of conflicts of laws and
international law: Neither a matter of absolute obligation on the one hand nor a mere courtesy and
good will on the other, but the recognition which one nation or state allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation or state, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are
under the protection of its laws.‖).
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the laws and public policy of the home forum are not violated. 119 Comity
is not, however, to take automatic precedence over the other factors of §
304(c), but rather should be considered in light of all of the factors that
Congress provided.120
Numerous commentators have examined the circumstances under
which courts should either defer to foreign proceedings or decline to
grant comity in favor of public policy arguments. 121 Section 304(c)(2) is
commonly cited as the source of the ―escape clause‖ reasoning that
courts use to abjure foreign law and apply local law instead. The escape
clause is a public policy exception that ―provides that if application of
the law chosen by the relevant conflicts rule would violate the public
policy of the forum state, the court can choose to apply forum law
instead.‖122 However, courts have not been consistent in their
determinations of what constitutes a public policy violation significant
enough to warrant not extending comity.123 While no fixed rule exists,
predictability is necessary to reach uniform results and thus allow for
more stability in cross-border financing. 124
Also significant to the concept of comity analysis is the extent to
which a foreign proceeding might discriminate against a U.S. creditor.
For instance, when a court grants a petition for a protective stay as part
of the initiation of an ancillary proceeding under § 304 of the Code—
which would ordinarily be circumvented by a financier under the
protections of § 1110—the financiers are arguably discriminated against
in the sense that they are left in a significantly worse position than they
would be under a U.S. main proceeding. However, New York courts in
particular are inclined to defer to the foreign proceeding, so convincing
119. See In re Culmer, 25 B.R 621, 628 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (granting petition of foreign
representative on grounds that no prejudice to creditors was shown by foreign proceedings and
reasoning that their primary consideration was ―whether the relief petitioners seek will afford
equality of distribution of the available assets‖)
120. See, e.g., In re Caldas, 274 B.R. 583 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (reasoning that comity,
considered in conjunction with the other § 304(c) factors, was not at odds with granting deference to
the foreign proceedings); In re Application of Papeleras Reunidas, S.A., 92 B.R. 584 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that comity should not be accorded when Spanish law prejudiced American
creditors under the other factors of § 304).
121. See, e.g., Hannah L. Buxbaum, Rethinking International Insolvency: The Neglected Role
of Choice-of-Law Rules and Theory, 36 STAN. J. INT‘L L. 23 (2000); Sandeep Gopalan,
Transnational Commercial Law: The Way Forward, 18 AM. U. INT‘L L. REV. 803 (2003).
122. See Buxbaum, supra note 121 at 40.
123. See, e.g., In re Toga Mfg., 28 B.R. 165, 168 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) (refusing to defer
to a foreign proceeding in which a local creditor was recognized as holding a secured claim under
U.S. law but would be an "ordinary" (unsecured) creditor under foreign law); Overseas Inns v.
United States, 911 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that foreign law would have implicated public
policy, unrelated to bankruptcy, favoring payment of income taxes).
124. Buxbaum, supra note 121, at 55.
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them of discrimination will likely require showing proof of a ―transaction
which is inherently vicious, wicked or immoral, and shocking to the
prevailing moral sense.‖125
VII. THE PETITION OF VARIG AIRLINES COMMENCE A CASE UNDER 11
U.S.C. § 304
The § 304 proceedings in the Varig case provide significant insight
into the handling of such international insolvency cases under U.S. law.
On June 17, 2005 (the Filing Date), Vicente Cervo, the foreign
representative of Varig, filed a petition in the Bankruptcy Court of the
Southern District of New York (the ―U.S. Court‖) to commence a case
ancillary to a foreign main proceeding in Brazil under the auspices of §
304 of the Code, Case No. 05-14400 (RDD).126 The petition coincided
with the filing of applications by Varig for the commencement of judicial
reorganization proceedings (the ―Foreign Proceeding‖) in the
Commercial Bankruptcy and Reorganization Court in Rio de Janeiro (the
Brazilian Court) pursuant to the NBRL.127
Varig sought the U.S. Court‘s protection principally to enjoin aircraft
and engine lessors and the financiers from repossessing the equipment; at
the time of filing, pre-petition claims by Varig‘s creditors were in the
tens of millions of dollars on past-due rent and maintenance reserves.128
Varig intended to extend the protective orders of the Brazilian Court to
make them enforceable in the United States against property and
creditors subject to U.S. jurisdiction. 129 Thus, the petition sought to
―obtain the assistance of [the] Court in protecting the property of Varig
for the benefit of all its creditors.‖130 It further asserted that as part of the

125. Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 203 N.E.2d 210, 212 (N.Y. 1964) (―[F]oreignbased rights should be enforced unless the judicial enforcement of such a [right] would be the
approval of a transaction which is inherently vicious, wicked or immoral, and shocking to the
prevailing moral sense.‖).
126. Petition Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 304, supra note 4, at 1.
127. Id. at 9. Judge Alexander dos Santos Macedo of the Commercial Bankruptcy and
Reorganization Court issued an interim order (a medida liminar) in compliance with the NBRL on
the Filing Date. The interim order—similar to a temporary restraining order in the United States—
specifically restrains aircraft creditors from seizing or interfering with Varig‘s use of equipment
essential to its operations. See Lobo et al., supra note 5, at 43.
128. See Lobo et al., supra note 5, at 42; Basch, supra note 2, at 38 (―Another significant
portion of Varig‘s pre-filing debt with lessors arose from prior rescheduling plans that Varig had
negotiated for repayment of unpaid rent over time.‖).
129. Lobo et al., supra note 5, at 72 (―This was particularly critical in Varig‘s case, because
nearly all of the aircraft creditors were located in the United States and could have repossessed their
equipment at any of the three U.S. airports where Varig landed.‖).
130. Petition Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 304, supra note 4, at 1.
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judicial reorganization under the NBRL, the debtor is permitted to
remain in control of its business and properties and is protected by a stay
from the attempts of most creditors to enforce claims against the
debtor.131 Through its foreign representative, Varig outlined the shell of
a reorganization plan and claimed that the stay of proceedings, if granted,
would provide the ―breathing space‖ necessary for it to complete its
restructuring and rework its balance sheet. 132
Varig argued that its anticipated reorganization plan would provide
for the fair treatment of creditors, result in a creditor-approved
restructuring of the debtor capital structure, and create a financially
stable reorganized airline. 133 A stated goal of the petition was to reduce
the costs of litigation by funneling all claims through the Brazilian Court
for adjudication, and accordingly, the foreign representative requested
injunctive relief to enable Varig to devote its resources to reorganizing
rather than litigating in the United States.134 The petition specifically
referenced five of the factors set forth in § 304(c), and, without
elaborating further, claimed that the grant of relief by the U.S. Court
would satisfy each of the factors by contributing ―to an economical and
expeditious administration of the foreign estates.‖135 On 17 June 2005,
the U.S. Court entered a temporary restraining order, granting Varig‘s
requested relief pending further consideration of the parties‘ arguments
and briefs.136
Varig‘s creditors in the United States immediately countered with
objections to the temporary restraining order entered by the U.S.
Court.137 Financiers accustomed to the protections afforded to them by §
1110 of the Code petitioned for relief from the stay and the right to have
131. Id. at 9.
132. Id. at 11.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 12.
135. Id.
136. Temporary Restraining Order, In re Petition of Vicente Cervo, as Foreign Representative
of Varig, S.A., et al., No. 05-14400 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
137. See, e.g., Objection of the Boeing Company to Temporary Restraining Order, In re
Petition of Vicente Cervo, as Foreign Representative of Varig, S.A., et al., No. 05-14400 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2005) (arguing, inter alia, that the filing of the § 304 proceeding was premature and thus
invalid, as Varig had not fulfilled all of the filing requirements in Brazil, nor had it had its foreign
representative approved by the Brazilian Court. It further argued that Article 199 of the NBRL does
not suspend the rights resulting from mercantile leases of aircraft and so it should be permitted to
pursue its rights of repossession.); Objection of International Lease Finance Corporation to Further
Continuation of Temporary Restraining Order at 9, In re Petition of Vicente Cervo, as Foreign
Representative of Varig, S.A., et al., No. 05-14400 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (arguing that § 304(a) is
inapplicable as no foreign proceeding is pending due to filing failures; arguing also that the debtors
wrongly characterize the aircraft leases as not being ―mercantile‖ leases and that the operating leases
should not be subject to a stay under the foreign proceedings.).
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any faults cured or to repossess their aircraft or equipment. 138 The lack
of an analogous provision to § 1110 in the NBRL (Article 199
notwithstanding) led the creditors to argue that the U.S. Court should not
recognize the Brazilian proceedings because the NBRL did not protect
claimholders in the same manner to which they were accustomed under
the Code. 139
The Varig‘s financiers made three basic arguments in their briefs to
the U.S. Court. The first, primarily procedural, was that Varig had not
met the burden of properly filing the assorted paperwork required by the
NBRL for a proceeding to commence; if no foreign proceeding was
properly initiated, then necessarily no ancillary proceeding could
follow.140 The second argument centered around § 1110 and the
protections afforded therein. 141 The third argument revolved around the
way in which both the Brazilian Court and the U.S. Court handled preand post-filing debt obligations.142
While undoubtedly a matter of great importance to all parties
involved, ultimately the issues regarding the proper filing of the suit were
resolved in the Brazilian courts and the case proceeded apace in both
Brazil and New York. This Article focuses not on this procedural line of
protest from the creditors, but rather the substantive argument of the
financiers centered on the perceived inequities of applying Brazilian law,
and the way that would affect the rights available to the creditors
regarding their collateral. Varig‘s foreign representative relied heavily on
the argument that § 304 of the Code authorized the U.S. Court to grant
relief in the form of continuation of the initial preliminary injunction. In
particular, it pointed to the flexibility afforded courts to ―broadly mold
appropriate relief in near blank check fashion.‖143 This conflict of
opinion formed the main argument between the parties regarding the
aircraft collateral and was the crux of the case.
138. See Lobo et al., supra note 5, at 43.
139. Id.; see, e.g., Objection of the Boeing Company to Temporary Restraining Order, supra
note 136.
140. See, e.g., briefs cited supra note 13.
141. See, e.g., Objection of U.S. Bank National Association, U.S. Bank Trust National
Association and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Trustees, to the Temporary Restraining Order or
Preliminary Injunction at 7, In re Petition of Vicente Cervo, as Foreign Representative of Varig,
S.A., et al., No. 05-14400 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (arguing that no power of the court may affect the
rights of creditors protected under § 1110). See Lobo et al., supra note 5, at 43.
142. See Basch, supra note 2, at 38 (noting that when post-filing defaults on debt should give
the creditor the right to possess, Brazilian courts found ways to prevent them from doing so in order
to protect Varig as a going concern).
143. Memorandum of Law in Support of Continuation of Preliminary Injunction, In re Petition
of Vicente Cervo, as Foreign Representative of Varig, S.A., et al., No. 05-14400 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2005) (citing In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 624 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
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In an attempt to satisfy both parties, instead of extending the
protections of § 1110 to the aircraft financiers as they had petitioned, the
U.S. Court crafted a ―contingency return plan‖ that purported to
approximate some of the protections of § 1110. 144 Varig was required to
prepare a schedule that showed the location of each asset and granted a
priority claim for any damages incurred as a result of missing parts or
maintenance documents. The U.S. Court directed Varig to seek to have
the contingency return plan, including the grant of priority claim,
approved by the Brazilian Court. The Brazilian Court approved the plan,
but the plan did not provide the relief that the financiers were seeking;
namely, it neither required the debtor to come current on arrearages and
default terms incurred pre-petition, nor granted creditors the option of
repossessing after the prescribed cure period. 145
VIII. OUTCOME ANALYSIS
The Varig Court, in extending comity to the debtor‘s application,
determined that the foreign main proceeding sufficiently protected
creditor interests and that U.S. public policy considerations were not
infringed. Comity, while an important (indeed, perhaps the most
important) factor of the six § 304 factors, does not trump all others, and
the U.S. Court in Varig considered each of the factors, especially
―protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and
inconvenience in the processing of claims in such foreign
proceeding.‖146
A. Section 304 and Modified Universalism
Section 304, propagated as an embracing of ―modified universality‖
by Congress in the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act, purports to assist the
foreign representative undertaking a foreign proceeding while still
preserving the discretion of the local court to protect the interests of local
creditors.147 However, because of the broad flexibility given to the court
(indeed, the very flexibility that the foreign representative espoused in its
motion to continue the preliminary injunction), the actual application of
144. Preliminary Injunction Order, In re Petition of Vicente Cervo, as Foreign Representative
of Varig, S.A., et al., No. 05-14400 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
145. See Lobo et al., supra note 5, at 72.
146. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(2) (2004). In cases where U.S. courts ultimately did not defer to the
law of the primary proceeding state, this section was most commonly cited as the basis for the
decision. See, e.g., Interpool, Ltd. v. Certain Freights, 102 B.R. 373 (D. N.J. 1988); In re Toga Mfg..,
Ltd., 28 B.R. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
147. Buxbaum, supra note 121, at 29.
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the law in ancillary proceedings in the United States has been somewhat
unsystematic. 148 This of course has the potential to lead to unpredictable
outcomes, which in the world of finance—especially aircraft finance—is
a dangerous thing.149
Modified universalism is a philosophy of international insolvency
jurisprudence that tempers a purely universal approach (advocating using
the law of only a single forum in adjudicating insolvency proceedings)
with an acknowledgement that in certain circumstances a local
proceeding and local forum rules may need to be applied. 150 The U.S.
system is a modified universalist approach, recognizing the need to
acknowledge foreign debtor proceedings in foreign courts (per § 304 and
now Chapter 15 of the Code) while maintaining a territorialist option for
protecting local creditors from unfairness or prejudice in those
proceedings (per § 304(c)(2)).151 Section 304 does not provide a brightline rule for judges regarding the way to apply the decision-making
process when evaluating the protections afforded local creditors versus
the deference to grant to the foreign proceeding.152 Each case in a § 304
ancillary proceeding involves the application of the law by the presiding
judge on an ad-hoc basis.
Although courts are overwhelmingly likely to defer to the foreign
proceedings, courts in the United States nonetheless will use public
policy exceptions—the above mentioned ―escape clauses‖—to ensure
fair results in the local forum when the foreign law would render an
injustice. 153 As Hannah Buxbaum says:
148. Id. at 30.
149. Id. (―Although the fair resolution of any individual case is of course desirable,
unpredictability of outcome is not. This is especially true in international bankruptcy, where
uncertainty as to the possible consequences of a debtor's bankruptcy renders creditor planning
difficult and cross-border lending unduly risky.‖).
150. See id. at 27.
151. See id.; see also John A. E. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for
International Bankruptcy, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 935, 951 (2005) (―A critical problem that universalism
faces . . . stems from the ongoing allure of territorialism to sovereignty-conscious states. Many states
will be happy to apply their own bankruptcy laws broadly to the resolution of an international
dispute, but few want to cede their sovereignty over the same dispute when they are deemed to be in
the ancillary position.‖).
152. In a purely universal or purely territorial insolvency system, the choice for a judge would
be clear: in universal proceedings, the law of the foreign forum prevails; in territorial systems, the
local forum law governs. See Buxbaum, supra note 121, at 31–32.
153. See Buxbaum, supra note 121, at 46; see also Pottow, supra note 151, at 952 (pointing out
that the challenge to pure universalism is getting courts to accept outcome differences; that is, ―the
commitment of rationally selfish states - which generally prefer to see their own substantive
bankruptcy laws govern - to cede sovereignty when another state has been chosen to control an
international bankruptcy dispute, even though such a concession may produce a different substantive
outcome to the bankruptcy for the deferring state's participants‖). This reluctance to cede sovereignty
manifests itself in multilateral or modified universal systems that allow public policy exceptions
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In a sense, public policy is merely the flip side
of comity: Where comity is viewed as a reason to accept
a choice leading to the application of the laws of another
nation, public policy is viewed as a reason to refuse that
choice, preferring instead to apply the laws of one‘s
own.154
While Congress explicitly embodied the public policy escape clause
into the Reform Act of 1994 with the language of § 304, the lack of
system-wide predictability creates problems in the arenas of international
financing and transaction costs. 155 In order to establish general
predictability for parties, ―only if the application of a particular foreign
law contravenes a public policy of the United States should a court refuse
to effectuate the choice of law resulting from the selection of
jurisdiction.‖156 As discussed below, the § 1110 provisions are those that
the financiers argued should be preserved as public policy exceptions
during cross-border insolvency proceedings.
B. Cases Addressing Comity Considerations
Cases in which U.S. courts have declined to defer to foreign main
proceedings under § 304 and principles of comity acknowledge the
primacy of comity and international cooperation as factors, but are
careful to point out that the other tests of § 304(c) must be given due
consideration in order to prevent § 304(c) from being ―effectively
eliminated from the statute, violating ‗[the court‘s] duty to give effect, if
possible, to every clause and word of a statute‘.‖ 157 Courts generally
recognize that the priority, preference, or automatic stay rules of a
foreign main proceeding need not be identical to those of the Code, as
demanding pure equivalence would be akin to reverting to territorialism

when needed to protect local creditors.
154. See Buxbaum, supra note 121, at 46.
155. See id. at 48 (―[A]ny court considering which law to apply to a particular case should
reach the same result, and that result should be predictable. These advantages are particularly
relevant to the resolution of international bankruptcy proceedings. If domestic creditors know that a
local action (whether a local bankruptcy proceeding or an action to attach a debtor's assets) will be
subordinated to the bankruptcy proceeding initiated in the debtor's home jurisdiction, they will be
less likely to initiate such actions, thereby increasing the likelihood that the estate will remain intact.
In addition, if creditors are aware in advance of the jurisdiction to which any future bankruptcy
proceeding concerning the debtor will be assigned, they will be able to enter into their financing
arrangements with an appreciation of the likely results of debtor insolvency.‖).
156. Id. at 58.
157. In re Treco, 230 F.3d 148, 157 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Gitten, 231 F.3d
77, 80 (2d Cir. 2000)).
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and would offend the spirit of international cooperation. However, the
factors of § 304(c) (or of the current § 1507) are not to be thrown aside in
a blind rush to confer comity on an ancillary proceeding. Courts must
―consider differences between American . . . rules and those applicable
to the foreign proceeding in determining whether affording comity will
be repugnant to American public policies,‖ and then ―consider the effect
of the difference in the law on the creditor in light of the particular facts
presented.‖158
i. In re Maxwell Communication Corp.
The court in In re Maxwell Communication Corp. looks beyond the
statutory factors for comity extension and considers broader public
policy implications including the impact on the parties and forums
involved. In fact, the case is one of the most important modern crossborder insolvency cases to address a wide range of dueling foreign law
considerations using principles of comity analysis.159 After the
controversial death of Robert Maxwell, a prominent publisher and
businessman whose many business interests were headquartered in
London but whose assets were largely located in the U.S., a Chapter 11
proceeding was brought in the U.S. simultaneously with an
administration in the United Kingdom. 160
The Maxwell court addressed the primary considerations of comity in
determining that it should defer to the courts and England law on a
question of avoidance of pre-petition transactions.161 The court began by
establishing that ―[w]hen construing a statute, the doctrine of
international comity is best understood as a guide where the issues to be
resolved are entangled in international relations.‖ 162 It then argued that
―international comity‖ is a ―canon of construction [that] might shorten
the reach of a statute.‖163 In Maxwell, the court was concerned that the
U.S. system should not take precedence if it appeared clear that English
law should apply based on concern for the international system as a
whole functioning properly. In other words, the court reasoned that
unless Congress legislates specifically against it, the doctrine of comity
may properly be used to analyze any statute in proceedings with foreign
158. Id. at 158–59.
159. In re Maxwell Commc‘n Corp., 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996).
160. Id.; see also Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Lessons of Maxwell Communication, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 2531, 2534 (1996).
161. In re Maxwell Commc‘n Corp., 93 F.3d 1036.
162. Id. at 1047.
163. Id.
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ties. In particular, the court stated:
Comity is especially important in the context of the Bankruptcy
Code for two reasons. First, deference to foreign insolvency proceedings
will, in many cases, facilitate ―equitable, orderly, and systematic‖
distribution of the debtor‘s assets . . . . Second, Congress explicitly
recognized the importance of the principles of international comity in
transnational insolvency situations when it revised the bankruptcy
laws.164
Having determined that a true conflict exists between U.S. and
English law (namely, English avoidance law requires a pre-petition
transfer to have been made with intent to benefit the creditor, whereas §
547 of the Code has no such requirement), the court went on to argue
that under the facts, English law had primacy to the dispute and thus
should apply. Looking at the location of the debt, overdraft facilities, and
other credit transactions, as well as choice of forum clauses in the
agreements between the debtor and creditors, the court believed that the
interests of the U.S. forum were not compelling enough to warrant
applying § 547 preference avoidance.165 ―The principal policies
underlying the Code‘s avoidance provisions are equal distribution to
creditors and preserving the value of the estate through the
discouragement
of
aggressive
pre-petition
tactics
causing
dismemberment of the debtor,‖ the court reasoned; and as the English
court effectuated those same policies with its laws, the court deferred to
the English primacy of interest.166
The court concluded by reasoning that in addition to the strong
jurisdictional interests of the English forum, the spirit of international
cooperation ―argues decidedly against the risk of derailing that
cooperation by the selfish application of our law to circumstances
touching more directly upon the interests of another forum.‖167 In
Maxwell, therefore, the test for extension of comity was based less on the
specific factors enumerated in § 304(c) and more on the balance of
interests involved for each party and each forum country.
It is important to note, however, the extent to which the court applied
a balancing test when choosing the applicable law to use. While in
Maxwell, the U.S. contacts were deemed so insignificant as to preclude
the application of U.S. law, the court analyzed the U.S. and English law
and determined that a true conflict does exist between the competing
164.
165.
166.
167.
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insolvency procedures, thus compelling the use of comity principles. 168
In the instant case, the court determined that the U.K. contacts to the case
had primacy over the U.S. contacts, 169 and in fact, the court
characterized the linkage to U.S. interests as ―not particularly weighty‖
and stated that the ―negative effects [of not applying the Code] are
insubstantial.‖170 Lawrence Westbrook speculates that had the U.S.
interests been greater, the choice of law analysis would have been more
closely addressed:
If, for example, the record in Maxwell had shown that the banks had
forced the company to make payments by liquidating important United
States operations, thereby putting United States creditors, employees,
and communities at risk, then interests to which the preference laws are
relevant would have been implicated. 171
The implication for the Varig creditors, perhaps, is that had they
been able to demonstrate a greater connection to the United States, the
court may have been more inclined to apply U.S. law.
ii. In re Treco
In In re Treco, U.S. interests were weighed more heavily and the
case establishes that perhaps the protection of U.S. creditors is valued
higher than comity interests. Unlike in Maxwell, the court in Treco
analyzed the § 304(c) factors in detail when considering a turnover
request in a Bahamian main proceeding and a U.S. ancillary
proceeding.172 At issue was the priority of the secured claim of a U.S.
creditor.173 Under Bahamian insolvency law, the secured claim was
subordinated to administrative expenses arising from the proceeding,
whereas under the Code, a secured creditor‘s interest is not relegated to a
lower priority than most administrative claims, and thus can usually

168. Id. at 1049.
169. Id. at 1051 (―England has a much closer connection to these disputes than does the United
States. The debtor and most of its creditors—not only the beneficiaries of the pre-petition transfers—
are British. Maxwell was incorporated under the laws of England, largely controlled by British
nationals, governed by a British board of directors, and managed in London by British executives . . .
. These same factors, particularly the fact that most of Maxwell's debt was incurred in England, show
that England has the strongest connection to the present litigation.‖).
170. Id. at 1052.
171. Westbrook, supra note 160, at 2537 (―[I]t must be conceded that the result is essentially a
case-by-case choice-of-law analysis. That approach pays the price of unpredictability to avoid the
harmful consequences of a mechanical territorial rule.‖).
172. In re Treco, 240 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2001).
173. Id. at 161. Note that for the purposes of its reasoning and arguments concerning secured
claims, the court assumed that BNY's claim was in fact secured. They ultimately remanded this case
for the lower court to decide that important point. Id.
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count on receiving the full value of its collateral. 174 While the debtor‘s
estate argued that comity was the primary factor to be considered under §
304(c), the court reasoned that the Code calls for a fact-specific inquiry
in light of all of the circumstances.175 While ―comity is the ultimate
consideration in determining whether to provide relief under § 304 . . .
[t]he statute plainly provides that the other factors may form the basis for
denying relief, and thus denying comity, in some cases.‖176 In addressing
the facts of the case, the court recognized that ―[i]t is implicit in the
concept that deference should be withheld where appropriate to avoid the
violation of the laws, public policies, or rights of the citizens of the
United States.‖177
The court then dismissed the first three factors of § 304(c) as
presenting no obstacle to the granting of comity to the Bahamian
proceedings: ―[t]here being no reason to doubt that the insolvency
proceeding in the Bahamas will be fair, impartial, procedurally sound,
and free from fraud, there is no question that comity would be extended
and the turnover order issued if our scrutiny of Bahamian bankruptcy law
were limited to these considerations.‖ 178 However, § 304(c)(4) indicates
a Congressional decision to require courts to look beyond mere
considerations of fairness and prejudice and to consider the specific
effects of applying foreign insolvency law to a U.S. creditor, specifically
in assessing the distribution of proceeds of an estate relative to how the
Code would prescribe the distribution.
Because the court found from the facts that the administrative
expenses of the estate were so large as to deplete the estate completely
and deprive the secured creditor of the value of its claim, the distribution
of proceeds ―in the Bahamian proceedings would thus not be
‗substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by‘ United States
law.‖179 The court‘s ―observation that security interests enjoy
constitutional protection supports [its] conclusion that United States law
affords strong protection to secured creditors and treats those protections
very seriously, a conclusion that, in turn, amplifies the significance of the
difference in the way secured claims are treated under Bahamian law.‖ 180
In the end, comity to the Bahamian court was held to be less important

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
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than the secured interest of the U.S. creditor, as the U.S. court found the
Bahamian procedures too prejudicial to U.S. creditors‘ interests.
C. Public Policy and § 1110
For a court to decline to grant comity, the decision more properly is
evaluated in terms of national interests than solely on the rights of any
particular domestic creditor.181 To be consistent with the goals of comity
and modified universalism, the ―trigger‖ for application of local law—
here, § 1110—should be the actual violation of public policy.
Secured creditors have protections built into the Code that are
derived from the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
The theory that the fifth amendment places substantive limits on the
ability of the government to restrain secured creditors‘ rights in
reorganization has crystallized into the following proposition: any
impairment of the liquidation value of a secured creditor‘s collateral
attributable to the exercise of powers conferred on the reorganization
court by bankruptcy legislation is, in the absence of just compensation, a
violation of the takings clause of the fifth amendment. 182
Clearly, protecting secured creditors is of high importance from a
public policy standpoint.
i. The public value of aircraft creditor priority
The United States has a legitimate interest in protecting secured
creditors in the airline industry. Expanding on the prior discussion of the
Congressional intention behind the enactment and continued refinement
of the protections given by § 1110, courts might reasonably deduce that
there is a high public value in giving ―super-priority‖ to aircraft creditors
in insolvency proceedings. The plain language of § 1110 indicates how
preemptive the clause is relative to the rest of the Code:
[T]he right of a secured party with a security
interest in equipment . . . to take possession of such
equipment, . . . and to enforce any of its rights and
remedies . . . is not limited or otherwise affected by any
other provision of this title or by any power of the
court.183

181. Buxbaum, supra note 11, at 68.
182. James Steven Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors’ Rights in Reorganization: A
Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 973, 977 (1983).
183. 11 U.S.C. § 1110(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
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The Section trumps all comers in the Code; it is evidence of the
importance placed on aircraft financiers rights‘ by Congress that the
protections of § 1110 are not to be abridged by any other section of the
Code. That, in and of itself, is an argument for handling its protections as
instruments of public policy. In United Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Bank N.A.,
the court even went so far as to say that the phrase ―any power of the
court‖ was not limited purely to the bankruptcy court.
The final clause of § 1110(a)(1) prevents bankruptcy judges from
using any source of law, including antitrust, as the basis of an injunction
against repossession. United protests this understanding, observing that
―power of the court‖ is the caption of the Code‘s § 105 . . . and
contending that the language ―any power of the court‖ thus must refer
back to § 105. Yet that would drain all meaning from the phrase ―any
power of the court‖ in § 1110(a)(1), for the preceding language already
blocks reliance on any other part of the Bankruptcy Code. Unless it is to
be empty, the phrase ―any power of the court‖ must deal with sources of
law outside the Bankruptcy Code. It is not as if ―power of the court‖
were a phrase limited to bankruptcy practice. It is generic language,
logically read to mean exactly what it says: ―any power of the court.‖184
Thus, under the plain language of the statute, Varig‘s creditors have
the right to take possession of the collateral pursuant to their agreements
with Varig, and those rights are not limited or otherwise affected by any
other provision of the Code, or by any power of the court. Under the
Seventh Circuit‘s theory, then, no external legal theory usurps the ability
of the financiers to repossess under § 1110. The court in In re Vanguard
elaborated further on this clause:
The legislative history of § 1110 provides further support
demonstrating that the statute means what it says. Prior to the 2000
amendments, § 1110(a)(1) provided that the underlying agreement was
―not affected by section 362, 363, or 1129, or by any power of the court
to enjoin the taking of possession False‖ In 2000, Congress changed the
wording of the statute, expressly deleting the limiting references to §§
362, 363, and 1129 in favor of the all-inclusive language, ―any other
provision of this title.‖ Thus, any argument for expressio unius est
exclusio alterius that existed prior to 2000—i.e., that [a section] was not
limited by § 1110 because [that section] was not specifically
mentioned—certainly cannot prevail after the amendments. Indeed,
under the rules of statutory construction, the more specific provisions in

184. United Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Bank N.A., 406 F.3d 918, 924 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in
the original).
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§ 1110—which concerns the relationship between a specific chapter, a
specific class of creditors, and specific collateral—should take
precedence over the more general provisions in [any other section]. 185
In other words, the legislative history of § 1110 reveals that its
enactment was primarily motivated by public policy concerns.
ii. Collateral value and financing predictability
The question, then, is how the provisions of § 1110 further a
legitimate public policy. Legal protection for collateralized securities has
a direct effect on the availability of external financing options for airlines
in developing and established financial markets. 186 As discussed, the
airline industry depends heavily on outside investments to raise capital.
Any legal reforms that encourage lending or secured financing increases
liquidity, which adds value—the gains from which will in some part be
passed back to the borrower.187 Within the airline industry, practically all
lenders require some sort of security to back a loan or lease contract,
usually in the form of taking collateral in the underlying aviation
asset.188 Technologically advanced, expensive, rapidly depreciating and
highly-mobile assets such as aircraft and aircraft engines have value as
collateral largely to the degree that a financier can repossess them
quickly and with minimal legal uncertainty upon debtor default, and then
sell or re-lease the collateral.189 The financing principles underlying the
lender‘s ability to extend asset-backed financing are that a financier:
(1) should be able to determine and assure itself that its proprietary
interest in a financed or leased asset is superior to all potential competing
claims against that asset; (2) upon default, will be able to promptly
realize the value of the asset and/or redeploy that asset for purposes of
generating proceeds/revenues to be applied against amounts owed; and
(3) will not have their rights described in (1) and (2) above qualified or
modified in the context of bankruptcy or insolvency. 190
In the United States, § 1110 guarantees to financiers that those

185. In re Vanguard, 295 B.R. at 916–17 (citing Pub. L. 106-181, Title VII § 744(b)).
186. Anthony Saunders et al., The Economic Implications of International Secured
Transactions Law Reform: A Case Study, 20 U. PA. J. I NT'L ECON. L. 309, 313. See also Kilborn,
supra note 7, at 65–66 (―A reduction in section 1110 protections may advance general bankruptcy
principles, but the gain to a relatively limited number of transportation debtors pales in comparison
to the cost of sacrificing the substantial advantages of strong section 1110 protections for developing
airlines.‖).
187. Saunders et al., supra note 186, at 313.
188. See id. at 315.
189. See id. at 317.
190. See id. at 316.
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financing principles will be met in the event that default occurs. Saunders
et al. argues that the § 1110 protections are significant in regards to the
cost of external asset-backed financing ―because the major international
credit rating agencies will give a rating enhancement of up to two
notches to debt issues so protected.‖ 191 The lower credit and liquidity
risks provided by § 1110 protection result in lowered spreads over the
risk-free interest rate offered by lenders. 192 Arguably, then, § 1110 has a
tangible effect on asset-backed financing within the airline industry that
extends beyond the immediate benefits to the secured creditor in an
insolvency proceeding; the external markets themselves reflect the
security and predictability provided to lenders. 193 This predictability
manifests itself favorably for the debtor as well, as premiums demanded
by investors are lowered and capital is thus more readily available. The
legal system, by enforcing § 1110, plays a substantial role in helping
predictability remain constant when default occurs and a lender seeks to
speedily repossess and enforce contractual rights.
D. Chapter 15 and Its Effect on the Case If Filed Today
Examining the Varig case from the perspective of the new Chapter
15 requirements for cross-border proceedings requires an analysis of the
new test for extending or declining to extend comity to a foreign main
proceeding. Debtors, creditors, and courts must determine whether the
new language of the Code will lead to different outcomes for § 1110
creditors than what occurred under § 304 of the old Code.
Section 1506 specifically provides that ―nothing in this chapter
prevents the court from refusing to take an action governed by this
191. See id. at 323.
192. See id. at 331–33 for a discussion of the effects on Standard & Poor‘s index of airline
stocks when the U.S. Bankruptcy Reform Act of October 22, 1994, was enacted. ―[T]he Standard &
Poor's index of airline stocks rose 3.43% in the week before the Reform Act's passage and 6.3% in
the week following, resulting in a two-week return of 9.73% in the period immediately surrounding
the Act's passage. By comparison, the Standard & Poor's 500 index fell 0.9% in the week prior to the
Act's passage and rose only 1.95% in the week following, resulting in a two-week return of 1.05%.‖
193. See Kilborn, supra note 7, at 43 (―In light of recent experience, the balance of burdens
appears to favor encouraging financing of the entire airline industry rather than avoiding the
disruption of individual bankruptcy proceedings.‖). See also United Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Bank N.A.,
406 F.3d 918, 924 (7th Cir. 2005) (―Section 1110(a)(1) gives the trustees a right to the return of
aircraft unless United pays the full rental or the lessors agree to accept a lower price. Those
conditions are not satisfied, so the bankruptcy judge must dissolve the injunction and allow the
lessors to repossess their collateral . . . The statute gives them that entitlement, treating aircraft
different from other assets. A credible threat to repossess the aircraft changes the terms on which
post-bankruptcy bargains can be struck; it is exactly this prospect that makes credit available on
better terms when air carriers shop for financing in the first place. United obtained the sort of terms
that were available from creditors secure in their ability to repossess the collateral; it must live with
those terms now, just as it must pay the current market price for jet fuel.‖).
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chapter if the action would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of
the United States.‖ However, the Committee Report for the new Act
specifically states that ―the word ‗manifestly‘ in international usage
restricts the public policy exception to the most fundamental policies of
the United States.‖ Thus, the bar is set high for convincing a court to
sidestep a request for comity.194 Traditional parochial interests in
sovereign power in the face of foreign main proceedings are preserved
by removing the language of Chapter 15 comity considerations from the
realm of ―shall‖ to ―may.‖195 That being said, the primary effect of
Chapter 15‘s enactment was to move ―comity‖ from the six § 304(c)
factors and to make it instead an overarching, primary consideration. 196
That is to say, Congress has made it explicitly clear that comity is in fact
a more influential factor for courts to consider when approaching foreign
main proceedings and requests for ancillary help.197 The case law that
has accrued under § 304 is still valid to the extent that courts use it to
assess comity in the face of the other factors to be considered. Thus, the
reasoning and strategies gleaned from previous cases still generally hold
true.
E. Harmonization with International Financing Principles
A further step in the analysis of the importance of § 1110 and the
protection of airline creditors to U.S. public policy is to examine the way
other states handle the same issue. The United States is not alone in
creating protections for financiers in the aviation arena. The International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law (―UNIDROIT‖) Convention
on International Interests in Mobile Equipment as modified by the
194. H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, pt. 1 (1995).
195. 11 U.S.C. § 1507(a) (2005) (―[T]he court, if recognition is granted, may provide
additional assistance to a foreign representative under this title.‖) (emphasis added).
196. 11 U.S.C. § 1507(b) (2005) states: In determining whether to provide additional assistance
under this title or under other laws of the United States, the court shall consider whether such
additional assistance, consistent with the principles of comity, will reasonably assure-(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in the debtor's property;
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and inconvenience in the
processing of claims in such foreign proceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property of the debtor;
(4) distribution of proceeds of the debtor's property substantially in accordance with the order
prescribed by this title; and
(5) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for the individual that such
foreign proceeding concerns.
197. See H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, pt. 1 (2005) (―Although the case law construing section 304
makes it clear that comity is the central consideration, its physical placement as one of six factors in
subsection (c) of section 304 is misleading, since those factors are essentially elements of the
grounds for granting comity. Therefore, in subsection (2) of this section, comity is raised to the
introductory language to make it clear that it is the central concept to be addressed.‖).
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Aircraft Equipment Protocol thereto (―Convention/Aircraft Protocol‖)
was formulated and adopted in November 2001, at a diplomatic
conference in Cape Town, South Africa. Fifty-three of the sixty-eight
attending states at the convention signed the final act; forty-one have
signed the Convention/Aircraft Protocol.198 The United States ratified
the Convention and Protocol on October 28, 2004.199 Brazil, however,
was not a party to the Convention and has not ratified the measures.
The scope of the Convention is not as broad as § 1110, only applying
―when, at the time of the conclusion of the agreement creating or
providing for the international interest, the debtor is situated in a
Contracting State.‖200 The Convention thus does not apply to the
particular facts of Varig, but the weight of the international movement
toward harmonization of aircraft financing protection swings the
pendulum toward the U.S. courts‘ application of § 1110 protections by
use of the public policy exception escape clause in § 304.
The Convention addressed many of the same concerns of
international aircraft financiers that § 1110 of the Code addressed for
U.S. lenders regarding asset-backed financing: the ability to determine
superior priority to all potential competing claims; the ability to realize
the value of the collateral promptly upon default; and the knowledge that
the first two rights will not be qualified or modified in a bankruptcy or
insolvency proceeding. 201 Countries that adopt the international
insolvency rule of the Convention/Aircraft Protocol choose to embrace
asset-backed financing principles; ―in particular, the international
insolvency rule will assist in internationalizing the types of financing
benefits and alternatives available to U.S. airlines under Section
1110.‖202 The advantages of stabilizing financing for aviation assets and
the predictability provided within those markets by a consistent
application of the protections described in the Convention/Aircraft
198. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), Convention on
International Interests in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001,
http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/mobile-equipment/mobile-equipment.pdf; see also
UNIDROIT, Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters
Specific to Aircraft Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001, http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/mobileequipment/aircraftprotocol.pdf.
199. See UNIDROIT, Status of the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment,
http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-2001-convention.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2007); see
also UNIDROIT, Status of the Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile
Equipment
on
Matters
Specific
to
Aircraft
Equipment,
Nov.
16,
2001,
http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-2001-aircraftprotocol.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2007).
200. UNIDROIT, Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, supra note 199,
at Art. 3(1).
201. Saunders et al., supra note 186, at 324.
202. Id. at 327.
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Protocol would contribute to micro- and macroeconomic benefits in
capital and transaction costs for all parties involved. ―International
commerce demands international law,‖203 and as more cross-border
transactions are conducted, more standardized cross-border legal
remedies are being sought. Thus, it is vital that U.S. courts recognize the
public policy implications of § 1110 when determining whether to grant
comity in international bankruptcy proceedings.
IX. CONCLUSION
The unique protections of § 1110 present a compelling case to deny
grant comity to foreign main insolvency proceedings that do not provide
similar protections. U.S. courts might use the public policy ―escape
clauses,‖ permitted by the doctrine of modified universalism, to enforce
the provisions of § 1110 that protect creditors. In order to convince the
court to deny comity, financiers approaching a Chapter 15 ancillary
proceeding need to emphasize (1) the extent to which their interests
would be impaired relative to the Code if a foreign insolvency law is
applied and (2) present a strong case that the center of interests for the
specific transactions leading to the § 1110 protections are mainly in the
United States and not the foreign forum. In sum, it is not a foregone
conclusion that a § 1110 financier will not receive the protections it
seeks, but in order to prevail, creditors must emphasize the particular
equities that would allow a court to apply the public policy tests and
decline to extend comity.
In future cross-border insolvency proceedings, U.S. courts may be
inclined to modify the foreign proceedings as necessary to make
available the § 1110 protections and therefore reassure an aviation
financing community that seeks predictability in lending and speedy
enforcement of rights in debtor default situations. Such an outcome will
stem from the international economic community‘s progress in
standardizing the collateral protections of mobile aircraft equipment and
the tangible financial market benefits that accrue when the collateral is
specially protected.

203. Gopalan, supra at 121, at 849.
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